Robin McConnachie (Oxford Anylitica; Former Senior Adviser, Bank of England)
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Lorenzo's thesis was that contagion from the US sub – prime mortgage failure quickly infected a number of European financial sectors causing a number of different problems which were difficult to deal with simultaneously in the absence of Europe - wide bodies to produce an effective response. He showed a number of useful charts using Italy as an example – in fact Italy had been less severely affected than many other European countries. But there had been a collective deficiency in the European response to the spread of the crisis, which he called a crisis of governance. For the future the answer was to have more effective European institutions rather than a plethora of rules which could not be enforced. The macro imbalances procedures currently being developed should enable countries to see in advance and hopefully take action to avert crises but this approach was not agreed by all, with resistance to large fines being levied on non-complying countries with excessive deficits, the perversity of this throwback to the SGP being particularly objected to. What was agreed was the need for debt deleveraging but this had hardly begun. European growth should be stimulated by exploiting the opportunities created by the single market e.g. the proposed capital markets union but the existing European authorities apart from the ECB were in a state of collective paralysis: there was strong resistance in many countries on important issues like bailing in lenders or creating yet more (costly) European institutions. An agreed roadmap was required to revive the European project.